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Abstract	
This	study	examines	rape	myth	use	in	eight	English	rape	trials	and	assesses	attempts	by	trial	
participants	to	combat	it.	Trial	notes,	based	on	observations,	were	analyzed	using	thematic	
analysis.	Rape	myths	were	used	in	three	identifiable	ways:	to	distance	the	case	from	the	
“real	rape”	stereotype,	to	discredit	the	complainant,	and	to	emphasize	the	aspects	of	the	
case	that	were	consistent	with	rape	myths.	Prosecution	challenges	to	the	myths	were	few,	
and	judges	rarely	countered	the	rape	myths.	This	study	provides	new	insights	by	
demonstrating	the	ways	that	rape	myths	are	utilized	to	manipulate	jurors’	interpretations	of	
the	evidence.	
	
Introduction	
Rape	 myths	 are	 widely	 held	 but	 false	 beliefs	 about	 rape,	 the	 nature	 of	 it,	 and	 the	
circumstances	 surrounding	 it.	 They	 have	 been	 described	 as	 “prejudicial,	 stereotyped,	 or	
false	beliefs	about	rape,	rape	victims,	and	rapists”	 (Burt,	1980,	p.	217).	 It	has	been	widely	
recognized	that	false	assumptions	about	rape	and	sexual	assault	are	dangerous	in	the	legal	
context	 as	 they	have	 the	potential	 to	 influence	decision-making	 (Ellison	&	Munro,	 2009a;	
Judicial	 Studies	 Board	 [JSB],	 2010;	 Temkin	 &	 Krahé,	 2008).	 Although	 Reece	 (2013)	 has	
recently	 criticized	 this	 view,	 her	 argument	 has	 been	 robustly	 challenged	 (Conaghan	 &	
Russell,	 2014).	 The	purpose	of	 the	 research	on	which	 this	article	 is	based	was	 to	 find	out	
whether	the	use	of	rape	mythology	could	still	be	found	in	modern	rape	trials	and,	if	so,	to	
examine	the	nature	of	its	use	and	attempts	made	by	trial	participants	to	combat	it.	
The	 academic	 study	 of	 rape	 myths	 has	 a	 long	 history	 (e.g.,	 Burt,	 1980),	 but	 a	 recent	
definition	 emphasizes	 both	 the	 content	 and	 function	 of	 these	 myths:	 “descriptive	 or	
prescriptive	 beliefs	 about	 sexual	 aggression	 (i.e.,	 about	 its	 scope,	 causes,	 context,	 and	
consequences)	that	serve	to	deny,	downplay	or	justify	sexually	aggressive	behavior	that	men	
commit	 against	 women”	 (Gerger,	 Kley,	 Bohner,	 &	 Siebler,	 2007,	 p.	 423).	 Examples	 include	
beliefs	that	the	only	genuine	rape	is	violent	rape	by	a	complete	stranger,	that	complaints	of	
rape	 are	 generally	 false,	 and	 that	 true	 victims	 report	 to	 the	police	 immediately.	Of	 course,	
some	 rapes	 are	 committed	by	 strangers	 and	do	 involve	 violence,	 some	 reports	of	 rape	are	
false,	 and	 some	 victims	 do	 report	 to	 the	 police	 immediately.	 However,	 myths	 involve	
generalizations	about	all	 rapes	and	therein	 lies	the	problem.	To	those	who	believe	 in	them,	
few	allegations	will	ever	qualify	as	real	rape.	
In	 England,	 the	 use	 of	 rape	 myths	 in	 court	 was	 identified	 in	 two	 key	 observational	
studies	(Adler,	1987;	Lees,	1996).	These	studies	found	that	defense	barristers1	drew	on	a	
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wide	 range	 of	 rape	 myths.	 They	 were	 used	 to	 undermine	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	
complainant,	 to	 blame	 her	 for	 the	 assault,	 and	 to	 make	 her	 appear	 unworthy	 of	 the	
protection	 of	 the	 law.	 Subsequently,	 legislative	 changes	 were	 introduced,	 which	 were	
designed	 to	 afford	 complainants	 more	 protection	 from	 questioning	 about	 their	 sexual	
history	 (s.41	 Youth	 Justice	 and	 Criminal	 Evidence	 Act	 1999	 (henceforth	 s.41)	 and	 “bad	
character”	 (s.100	 Criminal	 Justice	 Act	 [CJA],	 2003).	 The	 definitions	 of	 rape	 and	 consent	
were	 also	 revised	 (Sexual	 Offences	 Act	 [SOA],	 2003).	 S.41	 requires	 that	 a	 written	
application	 be	 made	 to	 the	 judge	 before	 evidence	 can	 be	 admitted	 about	 the	
complainant’s	 past	 sexual	 history.	 This	 must	 specify	 precisely	 the	 aspects	 of	 the	
complainant’s	 sexual	 history	 it	 is	 sought	 to	 explore	 and	 the	 grounds	 for	 doing	 so.	 The	
judge	may	approve	the	application	only	in	a	very	restricted	set	of	circumstances	set	out	in	
the	 legislation	 (see	Kelly,	Temkin	&	Griffiths,	2006	 for	 further	details).	Kelly	et	al.	 (2006)	
examined	the	operation	of	s.41,	and	concluded	that	sexual	history	evidence	was	still	being	
introduced	 frequently	 without	 the	 necessary	 application	 to	 the	 judge,	 while	 other	 rape	
myths	not	subject	to	the	restrictions	of	s.41	were	being	increasingly	mobilized.	Reference	
to	rape	myth	usage	by	both	barristers	and	judges	is	also	made	by	Smith	and	Skinner	(2012)	
who	conducted	a	more	recent	observational	study.	
Research	 has	 repeatedly	 shown	 that	 rape	myths	 can	 be	 influential	 in	 the	 perception	 of	
consent	and	rape	(Frese,	Moya,	&	Megías,	2004;	Gray,	2015),	as	they	provide	a	schema	that	
shapes	expectations	of	what	is	or	is	not	considered	to	be	rape	(Bohner,	Eyssel,	Pina,	Siebler,	&	
Viki,	2009).	Although	jurors	have	the	opportunity	to	engage	in	careful,	systematic	processing	
of	the	evidence	presented	(Chaiken,	1980),	this	is	not	sufficient	to	ensure	that	their	verdict	is	
accurate	or	unbiased.	Factors	such	as	lack	of	knowledge	about	rape	and	the	relative	ease	of	
relying	 on	 pre-existing	 beliefs	 about	 rape	 are	 likely	 to	 encourage	 quicker	 and	 less	 effortful	
heuristic	 processing	 (Chaiken,	 1980;	 Temkin	 &	 Krahé,	 2008).	 Moreover,	 regardless	 of	 the	
depth	of	processing	employed,	jurors	may	selectively	process	the	evidence	in	line	with	their	
pre-existing	beliefs	 about	 rape	 (Chaiken,	Giner-Sorolla,	&	Chen,	 1996).	 Thus,	when	defense	
counsel	(DC)	employ	rape	myths,	they	are	reinforcing	the	beliefs	of	those	who	believe	in	those	
myths,	while	also	potentially	raising	doubt	in	the	minds	of	those	who	generally	do	not.	
Rape	 myths	 have	 a	 notable	 effect	 on	 mock	 jury	 discussions	 of	 rape	 cases	 (Ellison	 &	
Munro,	2009a).	They	can	also	obstruct	attempts	to	educate	mock	jurors	as	to	the	reality	of	
rape	(Ellison	&	Munro,	2009b).	Research	has	shown	that	those	who	believe	in	rape	myths	
are	 more	 likely	 to	 find	 the	 defendant	 not	 guilty,	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 complainant	
consented,	and	to	place	at	least	some	of	the	blame	for	the	events	upon	the	complainant	
(e.g.,	Frese	et	al.,	2004;	Gray,	2006;	Hammond,	Berry,	&	Rodriguez,	2011).	
The	Crown	Prosecution	Service	(CPS)2	has	identified	a	number	of	common	rape	myths	and,	
while	it	recognizes	that	the	defense	has	a	duty	to	challenge	the	victim’s	account,	it	states	that	
prosecutors	“will	robustly	challenge	such	attitudes	in	the	courtroom”	(CPS,	2012,	p.	15).	It	also	
asserts	that	prosecutors	will	object	to	inappropriate	defense	cross-examination	regarding	the	
complainant’s	 sexual	 history	 and	 to	 “allegations	 about	 the	 character	 or	 demeanour	 of	 the	
victim	which	are	irrelevant	to	the	issues	in	the	case”	(CPS,	2012,	p.	34).	Efforts	to	improve	the	
prosecution	 of	 rape	 in	 this	 way	 are	 by	 no	 means	 new	 as	 specialist	 training	 for	 rape	
prosecutors	was	introduced	in	2007	(CPS,	2012).	However,	publications	such	as	the	Joint	CPS	
and	Police	Action	Plan	on	Rape	(2014),	which	emphasizes	that	the	focus	for	investigators	and	
prosecutors	should	be	the	behavior	of	the	defendant	rather	than	that	of	the	complainant,	and	
the	 report	 by	 Angiolini	 (2015)	 suggest	 that	 this	 training	 has	 not	 been	 adequately	
implemented.	 Based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 CPS	 case	 files,	 Angiolini	 (2015)	 observed	 that	 rape	
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myths	were	on	occasion	influential	in	CPS	decision-making,	and	that	there	was	little	evidence	
of	the	prosecution	discussing	strategies	to	combat	these	myths.	
In	addition	to	possible	challenges	from	the	prosecution,	judges	in	England	and	Wales	are	
now	able	to	give	directions	to	the	jury	regarding	the	danger	of	relying	on	stereotyped	beliefs	
about	rape	(JSB,	2010),	although	they	are	not	obliged	to	do	so.	Given	greater	understanding	
about	the	malign	effects	of	rape	myths	and	the	attempts	made	to	see	that	they	are	disputed	
in	court,	 it	might	have	been	expected	that	their	usage	would	be	declining.	The	purpose	of	
this	study	was,	therefore,	to	observe	a	small	sample	of	rape	trials	to	identify	whether	rape	
mythology	 figured	 in	 them	and,	 if	 it	 did,	 to	 obtain	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 the	way	 in	
which	rape	stereotypes	were	deployed	and	challenged.	
Method	
Design	
The	 study	 employed	 an	 observational	 design	 together	 with	 qualitative	 semi-structured	
interviews	with	some	of	the	barristers	appearing	in	the	observed	cases.	This	article	focuses	
on	the	trial	observations,	with	the	main	analysis	of	the	interviews	to	be	reported	elsewhere.	
Official	 recordings	 are	 made	 of	 trials	 conducted	 in	 the	 courts	 of	 England	 and	Wales	 but	
these	 are	not	 routinely	 transcribed.	 Transcription	 costs	 are	 very	high	 and	 researchers	 are	
not	allowed	to	use	recording	equipment	in	court.	Trial	observation	and	manual	note-taking	
was	therefore	selected	as	the	means	to	record	detailed	information	about	the	trials.	
	
Table	1.	Complainant/Defendant	Relationship	and	Verdict,	by	Trial.	
	 T1	 T2	 T3	 T4	 T5	 T6	 T7	 T8	
Relationship	Stranger	Previous	
relationshi
p	
Married	Previous	
relationshi
p	
Acquainteda	 Previous	
relationshi
p	
Acquainteda	Acquainteda	
Verdict	 Guilty	 Trial	
abandone
d.	Retrial	
ordered	
Guilty	 Not	guilty	 No	verdict:	
Jury	
disagreeme
nt	
Not	guilty	 Guilty	 Not	guilty	
Note.	T	=	trial.	
aConsidered	as	acquaintances,	but	the	complainant	met	the	defendant	for	the	first	time	on	
the	occasion	of	the	rape	itself.	
Trial	Observations	
The	 study	 involved	 observation	 of	 eight	 single	 perpetrator	 rape	 trials	 including	 one	
attempted	rape,	at	the	end	of	2010.	The	trials	took	place	in	several	different	Crown	Courts3	
in	London	and	the	southeast	of	England.	Each	week	throughout	the	data	collection	period,	
telephone	calls	were	made	to	all	the	courts	in	the	study	area	to	establish	whether	any	single	
perpetrator	 rape	 trials	were	 listed	 for	 the	 following	week,	 and	 to	 obtain	 any	 preliminary	
information	about	the	nature	of	the	case.	For	most	weeks,	there	was	only	one	relevant	trial	
scheduled,	but	if	there	was	more	than	one,	then	the	case	scheduled	to	last	for	no	more	than	
5	days	was	selected.	
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The	 study	 sample	 consisted	of	alleged	 rapes	by	one	 stranger,	 three	acquaintances,	one	
husband,	and	 three	previous	partners.	 The	 term	stranger	 has	been	used	where	 there	has	
been	 no	 previous	 interaction	 of	 any	 sort	 between	 complainant	 and	 defendant.	
Acquaintance	 has	 been	 used	 where	 there	 has	 been	 some	 limited	 interaction	 before	 the	
alleged	rape.	The	relationship	between	the	complainant	and	defendant	and	the	verdict	for	
the	eight	trials	are	shown	in	Table	1.	
Procedure	
Detailed	contemporaneous	notes,	using	a	form	of	shorthand,	were	taken	by	the	third	author	
throughout	seven	of	 the	 trials,	and	then	typed	up	during	 trial	breaks	and	at	 the	end	of	 the	
day.	In	Trial	1,	the	second	and	third	authors	conducted	the	observation	and	separately	took	
notes.	 The	 notes	 were	 subsequently	 compared	 and	 the	 adequacy	 of	 this	 method	 of	 trial	
recording	was	confirmed.	Although	not	quite	a	verbatim	transcript,	the	notes	provide	a	very	
full	account	of	the	trials,	with	direct	quotes	noted	where	particularly	relevant.	In	one	trial,	the	
judge	refused	to	allow	note-taking	in	the	courtroom.	Notes	were	therefore	made	during	the	
frequent	trial	breaks	and	these	were	supplemented	with	notes	taken	by	prosecuting	counsel	
(PC)	in	the	case.	The	third	author	had	approached	PC	to	request	an	interview	with	her	for	the	
study.	Aware	of	 the	 judge’s	embargo,	PC	offered	the	third	author	her	notes.	As	these	were	
extremely	 detailed	 including	 verbatim	 quotes,	 they	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 useful	 addition	 to	 the	
existing	material.	
Analytic	Approach	
Inductive	thematic	analysis	was	conducted	 in	accordance	with	the	procedures	suggested	by	
Braun	 and	 Clarke	 (2006).	 As	 the	 analysis	 focuses	 on	 observed	 practice	 in	 the	 courts,	 the	
analysis	was	carried	out	at	the	semantic	level,	taking	a	realist	perspective.	That	is,	no	attempt	
was	made	in	this	analysis	to	include	latent	conceptualizations	of	rape	myths	nor	to	explore	a	
social	constructionist	interpretation	of	the	data.	
The	first	stage	of	the	analysis	entailed	 identifying	whether	rape	myths	were	used	in	the	
trials,	 and	 if	 so	 which	 myths	 were	 present.	 Identifying	 rape	 myth	 usage	 is	 not	
unproblematic.	DC	has	 a	 duty	 to	 represent	 the	defendant	 and	 to	put	 forward	his	 case	 as	
strongly	 as	 possible,	 which	 can	 frequently	 entail	 a	 robust	 cross-examination	 of	 the	
complainant.	A	conservative	approach	toward	the	identification	of	myth	use	was	adopted,	
allowing	 the	 most	 leeway	 to	 counsel	 and	 only	 classifying	 myth	 use	 as	 occurring	 when	
counsel	expressly	made	generalizations	about	rape,	rape	victims,	or	rape	defendants,	which	
were	false	or	where	such	false	generalizations	were	clearly	implicit	in	the	argument.	
Having	 identified	the	myths	 in	use,	analysis	was	then	carried	out	to	explore	whether	there	
were	conceptually	discrete	ways	 in	which	they	were	deployed.	The	myths	were	grouped	 into	
initial	conceptual	themes,	which	were	reviewed	and	checked	back	to	the	original	trial	notes	to	
ensure	accuracy.	From	this	iterative	analytic	process,	there	emerged	two	overarching	themes,	
reflecting	on	one	hand	the	way	rape	myths	were	deployed	by	DC	and,	on	the	other,	how	the	
myths	 were	 challenged.	 These	 two	 overarching	 themes	 divided	 themselves	 into	 subthemes.	
Thus,	the	deployment	of	rape	myths	by	DC	is	subdivided	into	three	subthemes,	namely,	the	use	
of	the	real	rape	stereotype,	the	use	of	myths	purely	to	discredit	the	complainant,	and	the	use	of	
myths	that	relate	specifically	to	the	facts	of	the	case.	Challenges	to	rape	myths	are	subdivided	
into	two	subthemes,	namely,	prosecution	challenges	and	judicial	interventions	and	directions.	
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Analysis	
Defense	Use	of	Rape	Myths	
The	 study	 found	 that	 myth	 use	 was	 frequent.	 Across	 the	 course	 of	 the	 eight	 trials,	 the	
defense	had	recourse	 to	a	 remarkably	wide	 range	of	myths	as	 is	 illustrated	 in	Table	2.	All	
have	been	previously	identified	in	the	literature	of	rape	mythology	(e.g.,	Payne,	Lonsway,	&	
Fitzgerald,	 1999;	 Temkin	 &	 Krahé,	 2008).	 The	 myths	 were	 used	 in	 subtly	 different,	 if	
overlapping,	ways	and,	as	mentioned	above,	three	themes	were	identified.	In	Theme	1,	DC	
draws	 on	 the	 stereotype	 of	 what	 happens	 before,	 during,	 and	 after	 a	 “real	 rape,”	
highlighting	 the	 elements	 of	 it	 that	 are	missing	 in	 the	 case	 in	 question,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	
casting	doubt	on	the	prosecution’s	allegations.	In	Theme	2,	rape	myths	are	used	to	discredit	
the	 complainant,	 focusing	 on	 her	 character	 and	 background.	 In	 Theme	 3,	 rape	 myths	
relating	to	the	specific	facts	of	the	case	are	mobilized.	
Theme	1:	 The	 “real	 rape”	 stereotype	as	 the	 standard.	The	 classic	 stereotype	of	 a	 genuine	
rape	is	a	violent	sexual	attack	by	a	stranger	(Temkin	&	Krahé,	2008),	where	the	victim	does	
all	 she	 can	 to	 resist,	 incurring	 injury	 and/or	 torn	 clothes	 in	 the	 process,	 and	 immediately	
reporting	 the	 matter	 to	 the	 police.	 In	 Theme	 1,	 DC	 invokes	 this	 stereotype	 and	 then	
attempts	to	distance	the	case	 in	hand	from	it	by	pointing	to	the	relationship	between	the	
parties,	 however	 tenuous,	 and	 emphasizing	 the	 absence	 of	 injuries,		
	
Table	2.	A	“Map”	of	Defense	Myths	and	Judicial	Directions,	by	Trial.	
	 Trial	1	 Trial	2	 Trial	3	 Trial	4	 Trial	5	 Trial	6	 Trial	7	 Trial	8	
No.	of	myths	used	by	
defense	
3	 4	 6	 6	 5	 7	 6	 1	
Lack	of	injury/torn	
clothes	
	 ✓	 	 	 ✓	 ✓a	 	 	
Failure	to	resist	 	 	 ✓a	 	 	 	 ✓	 ✓a	
Absence	of	
immediate	
complaint	
	 	 ✓a	 	 ✓a	 	 	 	
Rape	complainants	
are	commonly	liars	
✓	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 ✓	 	
Sexual	history	 	 ✓	 	 ✓	 	 ✓	 ✓a	 	
Previous	allegations	
of	rape	suggest	
fabrication	
✓	 	 	 ✓	 	 	 	 	
Rape	is	an	easy	
allegation	to	make	
(Hale’s	dictum)	
	 	 ✓	 	 	 ✓	 	 	
Rape	by	former	
partner/husband	is	
not	really	rape	
	 ✓	 ✓a	 ✓	 	 ✓a	 	 	
Real	victims	of	
marital	rape	leave	
the	marital	home	
	 	 ✓	 	 	 	 	 	
Sex	offenders	are	 	 	 	 ✓	 	 	 ✓	 	
		 7	
different	from	
ordinary	people	
Complainant’s	
clothing	may	
precipitate	rape	
	 	 	 	 	 ✓a	 	 	
Kissing	as	consent	 	 	 	 ✓	 ✓	 	 ✓a	 	
Post-rape	
behavior/demeanor	
in	court	
✓	 	 	 	 ✓a	 ✓	 ✓	 	
aIndicates	that	the	judge	gave	a	direction	in	response	to	the	myth.	
resistance,	torn	clothes,	and	immediate	reporting.	The	defense	is	therefore	focusing	not	on	
what	 happened	 but	 rather	 on	 what	 did	 not	 happen	 and	 thereby	 suggesting	 that	 rape	 is	
unlikely	to	have	taken	place.	
Statistics	for	England	and	Wales	show	that	only	14%	of	serious	sexual	offences	involve	a	
stranger	attack	(Office	for	National	Statistics	[ONS],	2013).	Moreover,	it	is	a	myth	both	that	
rape	necessarily	involves	injury	or	torn	clothing	and	that	where	force	is	used,	this	will	always	
leave	a	trace	by	way	of	marks	or	bruising.	Victims	of	rape	may	well	suffer	no	genital	or	other	
physical	 injury	 (Bowyer	 &	 Dalton,	 1997;	 Sugar,	 Fine,	 &	 Eckert,	 2004).	 Yet	 these	 myths	
featured	strongly	in	two	of	the	eight	trials	(5	and	6)	and	were	also	present	in	Trial	2.	In	Trial	
6,	 the	defense	 referred	3	 times	 to	absence	of	 injury.	The	complainant	 (henceforth	C)	was	
asked	in	cross-examination	whether	she	had	suffered	injuries	to	her	genital	region	or	to	the	
rest	of	her	body.	She	said	that	she	had	not.	In	her	closing	speech	to	the	jury,	DC	said	“C	said	
that	D	had	used	force	to	prise	her	legs	apart,	force	to	pull	her	shoulder	down	yet	she	had	no	
injuries	 at	 all,	 no	 red	 marks.”	 Thus,	 DC	 was	 relying	 on	 the	 false	 idea	 that	 any	 force	
necessarily	entails	injury	and	that	without	force	or	injury	real	rape	has	not	occurred.	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 requirement	 for	 injury,	 the	 “real	 rape”	 stereotype	 also	 includes	 the	
expectation	that	genuine	victims	will	always	employ	one	or	more	of	a	number	of	avoidance	or	
resistance	strategies.	This	bears	no	relationship	to	reality,	and	fails	to	account	both	for	the	fact	
that	victims	are	often	terrified	that	struggle	will	 lead	to	injury	or	death	and	for	the	paralyzing	
effect	of	fear	on	the	ability	to	shout	or	get	away	(Rape	Crisis,	n.d.).	It	also	fails	to	account	for	the	
strength	differential	between	most	men	and	women.	
The	avoidance/resistance	myth	 featured	 in	 three	 trials	 (3,	7,	 and	8).	 In	Trial	7,	C,	when	
drunkenly	making	her	way	home,	met	a	stranger,	D,	whom	she	allowed	into	her	flat.	There	
he	allegedly	raped	her.	She	was	questioned	by	DC	as	to	why	she	did	not	ask	him	to	 leave	
and	failed	to	fight	back,	yell,	swear,	or	resist:	“At	no	point	did	you	say	‘get	the	fuck	out	of	
here	as	my	flatmate	is	in	his	room	and	he’ll	come	and	beat	you	up?’	Did	you	never	once	yell	
or	swear?”	There	were	five	questions	to	this	effect.	C	explained	that	she	was	afraid	he	was	
going	 to	 kill	 her	 and	 her	 strategy	 was	 to	 go	 along	 with	 what	 he	 wanted.	 In	 her	 closing	
speech,	DC	 reiterated	 the	point:	 “Would	 a	 victim	not	 at	 least	 scream	or	do	 something	 to	
show	some	kind	of	resistance?	.	.	.	She	did	not	offer	any	resistance	whatsoever	to	get	rid	of	
him.”	
Victims	of	rape	rarely	report	to	the	police	right	away	(see,	on	this,	R	v.	Valentine	1996),	
and	many	never	report	to	the	police	at	all	(Ministry	of	Justice	[MJ],	Home	Office	[HO],	&	the	
ONS,	 2013).	 Some	 are	 reluctant	 to	 mention	 the	 matter	 to	 anybody	 (Stewart,	 Dobbin,	 &	
Gatowski,	1996).	The	myth	that	genuine	rape	victims	will	 report	 immediately	was	 invoked	
particularly	 in	 two	 trials	 (3	 and	 5).	 In	 Trial	 3	 there	was	 some	 delay	 before	 C	 reported	 to	
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anyone	that	she	had	been	repeatedly	raped	by	her	husband.	DC	cross-examined	C	and	two	
witnesses	at	great	 length	about	 this,	 implying	 that	genuine	victims	 report	 immediately.	 In	
her	closing	speech	DC	claimed	that	the	delay	suggested	C	was	lying.	
Even	 in	 an	adversarial	 system,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 justify	 the	use	of	 Theme	1	mythology.	Cross-
examination	 about	 the	 absence	of	 features	 consistent	with	 the	 stereotype	of	 a	 “real	 rape”	
serves	no	other	purpose	than	to	mislead	the	jury.	DC	utilizes	these	ideas	to	encourage	the	jury	
to	 distance	 the	 events	 from	 the	 stereotyped	 image	 of	 a	 “real	 rape.”	 However,	 it	 is	 of	 no	
significance	that	C	was	uninjured,	that	her	clothing	was	undamaged,	or	that	she	failed	to	resist	
unless	there	is	specific	evidence	that	suggests	that	such	a	result	would	have	been	expected	in	
the	particular	circumstances	of	the	case.	
Theme	 2:	Myths	 used	 purely	 to	 discredit	 the	 complainant.	 In	 Theme	 2,	 stereotypes	were	
used	as	part	of	a	concerted	attempt	to	discredit	the	complainant	by	focusing	on	her	history,	
psychology,	or	character.	
A	common	myth	is	that	rape	allegations	are	frequently	or	even	generally	false.	However,	
the	CPS	has	recently	pointed	out	that	there	are	many	prosecutions	for	sexual	offences	but	it	
has	 had	 occasion	 to	 prosecute	 very	 few	 complainants	 for	 making	 false	 allegations	 (CPS,	
2013).	 Nonetheless,	 this	myth	 featured	 in	 three	 trials	 (1,	 2,	 and	 3),	 and	 there	was	 some	
reference	to	it	in	Trials	4,	5,	6,	and	7.	In	pursuance	of	this	myth,	DC	in	Trials	3	and	6	were	not	
above	harking	back	to	Lord	Justice	Hale’s	discredited	17th-century	dictum	that	rape	“is	an	
accusation	easily	to	be	made	and	hard	to	be	proved	and	harder	to	be	defended	by	the	party	
accused	tho	never	so	innocent”	(Hale1PC	635).	In	her	closing	speech	in	Trial	6,	DC	said,	
Unfortunately,	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 courts	 is	 that	 false	 allegations	 of	 this	 type	 are	
made,	sadly	regularly	made,	and	are	made	for	all	sorts	of	reasons.	Allegations	are	quite	
easy	to	make:	You	only	have	to	say	it	and	it	has	to	be	investigated.	
This	 theme	 was	 even	 taken	 up	 by	 the	 judge	 in	 the	 case,	 who	 reiterated	 that	 “sexual	
allegations	are	easy	to	make	but	difficult	to	refute.”	It	is	well	established	today	that	rape	is	a	
very	difficult	allegation	 to	make	and,	as	noted	above,	most	 rapes	are	not	 reported	 to	 the	
police	 (MJ,	 HO,	 &	 ONS,	 2013).	 Contrary	 to	 the	 adage,	 as	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 is	 on	 the	
prosecution	 and	 not	 on	 the	 defense,	 it	 is	 an	 allegation	 that	 is	 hard	 to	 prove	 beyond	
reasonable	doubt.	Conviction	rates	for	rape	testify	to	this,	which	show	that	only	about	7%	of	
rapes	recorded	by	the	police	 in	England	and	Wales	result	 in	a	conviction	(MJ,	HO,	&	ONS,	
2013).	
In	 Trial	 1,	 involving	 attempted	 rape	 by	 a	 complete	 stranger,	 the	 prosecution	 had	 a	 very	
strong	 case	 as,	 unusually,	 the	 incident	 had	 been	 directly	 observed	 by	 two	 excellent	
independent	witnesses.	Arguing	that	the	witnesses	were	mistaken	and	that	C	was	lying	about	
what	 had	 happened,	 DC	 successfully	 applied	 to	 the	 judge	 to	 cross-examine	 C	 about	 her	
alleged	bad	 character	 (s.100	CJA).	A	 very	 lengthy	 cross-examination	ensued	 taking	 in	 every	
aspect	of	C’s	past.	C,	it	was	claimed,	was	a	violent	drunk,	a	woman	of	bad	character	who	had	
made	 previous	 rape	 allegations	 and	 whose	 word	 about	 what	 had	 happened	 could	 not	
therefore	 be	 trusted.	While	DC	 could	 not	 be	 faulted	 for	 attempting	 to	 do	 the	 best	 for	 her	
client,	 this	 heavy-handed	 character	 assassination,	 which	 was	 deeply	 distressing	 for	 the	
complainant,	seems	in	the	circumstances	of	the	case	hard	to	justify.	It	proved	to	be	of	no	avail	
as	D	was	convicted.	
In	both	Trials	5	and	7,	C’s	drunkenness	at	the	time	of	the	alleged	rape	was	used	by	DC	to	
argue	 that	 she	 was	 lying	 and	 had	 consented	 when	 drunk	 but	 regretted	 it	 later.	 In	 such	
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circumstances,	according	to	the	leading	case	of	R	v.	Bree	(2007),	her	claim	of	rape	would	be	
invalid	as	consent	given	when	drunk	is	still	considered	to	be	consent	(see	Wallerstein,	2009,	
for	a	critique).	Research	shows	the	pervasiveness	of	 the	myth	that	women	who	give	 their	
consent	when	drunk	will	often	cry	rape	afterwards	(e.g.,	Gunby,	Carline,	&	Beynon,	2012).	
DC’s	assertions	were	therefore	likely	to	strike	a	chord	with	the	jury.	In	Trial	5,	C	was	walking	
home	at	night	when	D,	who	was	standing	at	a	bus	stop,	started	talking	to	her,	followed	her	
home	 and	made	 his	way	 into	 her	 house	where	 he	 allegedly	 raped	 her.	 DC	 described	 the	
alleged	rape	as	“a	slightly	embarrassing	sexual	encounter	portrayed	as	rape.”	He	suggested	
to	 C,	 “You	 behaved	 a	 little	 out	 of	 character	 after	 having	 a	 few	 drinks	 and	 were	 a	 bit	
embarrassed	afterwards.”	But	DC	did	not	 seek	 to	 explain	why,	 if	 embarrassment	was	 the	
motive	for	a	false	allegation	of	anal	rape,	C	would	have	wished	to	go	through	with	a	police	
investigation	and	public	trial.	
Research	has	found	that	sexual	history	evidence	is	influential	with	juries	(Mason,	Riger,	&	
Foley,	2004).	As	noted	above,	s.41	requires	that	a	written	application	be	made	to	the	judge	
before	evidence	can	be	admitted	about	C’s	past	sexual	history.	Despite	this,	the	study	found	
that	C’s	sexual	history	with	third	parties	was	introduced	in	four	of	the	trials	(2,	4,	6,	and	7)	
without	any	s.41	application	to	admit	it.	There	was	scant	evidence	of	any	judicial	attempts	
to	 stop	 this	 happening	 or	 to	 require	 the	 editing	 of	 video-recorded	 police	 interviews	
containing	sexual	history	evidence.	
In	Trial	2,	DC	applied	pre-trial	to	cross-examine	C	about	her	sexual	relationships	with	other	
parties,	and	after	C	gave	her	evidence	in	chief	the	judge	told	DC	to	apply	in	writing	under	s.41.	
The	 judge	 commented	 to	 the	 researcher	 after	 the	 trial	was	 adjourned	 that	 the	 defense	was	
doing	its	utmost	to	have	C’s	previous	sexual	relationships	brought	out	in	court	and	he	was	not	
going	 to	 allow	 this	 to	 happen.	 Despite	 the	 judge’s	 good	 intentions,	 before	 any	 written	
application	was	made,	DC	still	managed	to	cross-examine	C	about	a	previous	rape	by	a	Black	
man	[sic]	with	a	gun,	which	he	claimed	had	taken	place	but	which	C	denied.	The	judge	did	not	
intervene	at	this	stage	but	later	on	in	the	trial,	he	sent	the	jury	out	and	reprimanded	DC	for	the	
“badgering”	style	of	his	cross-examination.	
In	Trial	4,	although	a	s.41	application	had	been	made,	which	covered	previous	allegations	
by	C	of	sexual	abuse	by	her	father,	it	did	not	cover	C’s	previous	relationships	with	other	men.	
Nonetheless,	 in	 contravention	 of	 s.41,	 DC	 asked	 her	 about	 two	 older	 men	 she	 had	 had	
relationships	with	to	show	she	was	not	averse	to	having	sex	with	older	men	like	D	who	was	20	
years	older	than	she	was.	She	was	also	questioned	about	her	sexual	relationship	with	another	
man	during	her	on/off	relationship	with	D.	There	was	no	judicial	intervention	to	prevent	these	
lines	of	questioning.	
In	 Trial	 6,	 C	 alleged	 that	 she	 had	 been	 raped	 by	 a	 former	 partner	 with	 whom	 she	 had	
previously	had	an	on/off	relationship.	In	her	video-recorded	police	interview,	C	had	described	
the	 sexual	 nature	 of	 this	 relationship.	 The	 judge	 decided	 that,	 as	 the	 jury	 would	 see	 this	
interview,	 there	 was	 no	 need	 for	 a	 s.41	 application	 which	 would,	 in	 any	 case,	 have	 been	
successful.	However,	 in	addition	to	exploring	in	depth	C’s	relationship	with	D,	DC,	 in	blatant	
contravention	of	s.41,	questioned	her	about	her	relationships	with	other	men	when	she	was	
not	 seeing	 D.	 Instead	 of	 cutting	 off	 this	 line	 of	 cross-examination,	 remarkably,	 the	 judge	
himself	 questioned	 her	 about	 this	 matter,	 reiterating	 to	 the	 court	 that	 she	 had	 had	 a	
relationship	 with	 someone	 else	 during	 one	 of	 these	 “off	 periods.”	 Quite	 apart	 from	 the	
irrelevance	 and	highly	 prejudicial	 nature	 of	 this	 questioning	 about	 sex	with	 third	 parties,	 it	
should	not	have	been	permitted	outside	a	s.41	application.	
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Again,	 in	 Trial	 7,	 C	 had	 been	 asked	 in	 her	 police	 interview	 about	 her	 previous	 sexual	
experience	with	others.	As	a	result,	her	sexual	history	was	revealed	when	the	video	recording	
of	the	interview	(see	Achieving	Best	Evidence,	MJ,	2011),	was	shown	unedited	in	court.	In	the	
absence	 of	 any	 s.41	 application,	 both	 prosecution	 and	 defense	 then	 referred	 to	 C’s	 sexual	
experience.	 In	 her	 closing	 speech,	 DC	 said	 that	 C	 was	 “a	 much	 older,	 confident	 woman,	
worldly-wise	who	had	had	a	lot	of	sex	and	knew	what	she	wanted	.	.	.	C	and	D	had	one	thing	in	
common—their	attitude	to	sex	and	one	night	stands.”	But,	DC	added,	she	was	not	asking	the	
jury	to	judge	C’s	“promiscuous	sex	life.”	
Another	attack	on	the	complainant’s	credibility	came	through	reliance	on	the	myth	that	
a	previous	allegation	of	rape	indicates	that	the	complainant	is	lying.	This	occurred	in	two	
trials	(1	and	4).	It	relies	on	the	idea	that	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	a	person	would	have	been	
raped	or	abused	more	than	once.	Evidence,	however,	shows	that	victims	of	rape	or	sexual	
assault	have	frequently	had	this	experience	previously	(e.g.,	Myhill	&	Allen,	2002).	
In	Trial	4,	DC	applied	under	s.41	to	cross-examine	C	about	her	previous	allegations	of	rape	
and	sexual	abuse.	The	 judge	decided	that	 there	was	no	evidence	that	 these	allegations	were	
false.	He	gave	permission	for	one	question	only	to	be	asked	about	them	in	relation	to	a	panic	
attack	 that	C	had	 suffered	after	 the	alleged	 rape.	However,	DC	managed	 to	 refer	5	 times	 to	
these	 previous	 allegations	 of	 sexual	 assault.	 In	 her	 closing	 speech,	 she	 reminded	 the	 jury	 at	
some	 length	 that	 C	 had	 previously	 made	 three	 separate	 allegations	 against	 three	 separate	
males.	While	this	was	supposedly	relevant	to	the	panic	attack,	it	inevitably	invoked	this	myth.	
The	judge	made	no	attempt	to	intervene	at	any	stage.	
Section	41	was	introduced	to	deal	with	highly	prejudicial	myths	relating	to	C’s	past	sexual	
history.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 study	 by	 Kelly	 et	 al.	 (2006),	 which	 demonstrated	 flaws	 in	 the	
operation	of	s.41,	steps	were	taken	to	tighten	procedures	and	to	require	written	applications	
pre-trial	(see	MJ,	Criminal	Procedure	Rules,	Part	36).	But	the	present	small	study	suggests	that	
s.41	 is	 still	 not	operating	 as	 it	 should.	As	 legal	 restrictions	 are	 ignored,	myths	 about	 sexual	
history	are	permitted	to	enter	the	courtroom.	
It	is	not	unusual	in	criminal	trials	for	attempts	to	be	made	to	discredit	witnesses.	Indeed,	
this	 is	an	accepted	part	of	the	defense	role.	However,	as	seen	in	Trial	1,	this	can	involve	a	
sustained	 onslaught	 of	 vilification.	 In	 Theme	 2,	 the	 reliance	 on	myths	 to	 discredit	 C	 and	
make	her	appear	deserving	of	her	fate,	an	unworthy	woman	or	a	liar,	is,	it	is	argued,	hard	to	
justify.	
Theme	3:	Invocation	of	myths	in	relation	to	the	specific	facts	of	the	case.	In	this	theme,	the	
most	frequently	used,	the	actual	facts	of	the	case	are	used	as	a	platform	for	the	invocation	
of	 stereotypes.	 It	 goes	without	 saying	 that	 counsel	 cannot	 be	 criticized	 for	 discussing	 the	
facts	 of	 the	 case,	 for	 example,	 that	 C	 and	D	were	married,	were	 former	partners,	 or	 had	
engaged	 in	 kissing	 before	 the	 event	 in	 question.	 The	 fault	 lies	 in	 invoking	 false	 ideas	 in	
relation	to	those	facts	and	inviting	false	conclusions	from	them.	
A	prevalent	myth	drawn	on	by	DC	in	four	of	these	trials	(2,	3,	4,	and	6)	was	that	marital	
rape,	 rape	 by	 a	 former	 partner,	 or	 rape	 by	 someone	 with	 whom	 C	 has	 previously	 had	
consensual	sex	is	not	really	rape,	and	if	consent	was	absent	on	a	particular	occasion,	there	is	
no	 real	 harm	done.	 Contrary	 to	 this	myth,	 the	 harm	of	 rape	 by	 previous	 partners	 is	well	
established	(see,	for	example,	Coker,	Weston,	Creson,	Justice,	&	Blakeney,	2005).	In	Trial	3,	
C	was	allegedly	 raped	by	her	husband.	During	 the	 trial,	DC	 repeatedly	emphasized	 that	D	
and	C	were	married,	referring	to	the	“marital	bed,”	“marital	relations,”	“marital	bedroom,”	
and	 “marital	 home.”	 There	 were	 10	 references	 in	 all	 to	 C’s	 marital	 status.	 The	 clear	
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implication	was	that	whatever	had	happened,	this	was	after	all	a	marriage	and	therefore	it	
was	not	true	rape.	Similarly,	 in	Trial	4,	 in	cross-examining	C	and	examining	D,	DC	made	15	
separate	references	to	C’s	previous	sexual	relationship	with	D.	While	marriage	or	a	previous	
relationship	are	clearly	relevant	to	the	 issue	of	consent	and	therefore	a	 legitimate	subject	
for	some	cross-examination,	DC,	in	heavily	focusing	on	C’s	relationship	with	D,	is	pursuing	a	
further	agenda	and	also	distancing	the	case	from	the	real	rape	stereotype.	
A	related	myth	seen	in	Trial	3	 is	that	 if	marital	rape	had	indeed	occurred,	the	wife	would	
immediately	 depart	 the	 marital	 home	 never	 to	 return	 or,	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 abandon	 the	
marital	bedroom	until	such	time	as	she	could	secure	her	departure.	Many	women	who	have	
experienced	intimate	partner	(sexual)	violence	are	asked	why	they	do	not	leave	the	abusive	
relationship	 (Murray,	 2008;	 Rhodes	 &	McKenzie,	 1998).	 The	 factors	 associated	with	 either	
staying	or	 leaving	are	numerous	and	complex	(see	Rhodes	&	McKenzie,	1998,	for	a	review).	
Indeed,	 Carline	 and	 Easteal	 (2014)	 emphasized	 that	 multiple	 forms	 of	 coercion	 may	 be	
brought	 to	 bear	 in	 abusive	 relationships,	 which	 restrict	 women’s	 choices.	 In	 Trial	 3,	 C,	 an	
asylum	seeker,	was	cross-examined	repeatedly	in	five	different	threads	of	questioning	about	
why	 she	continued	 to	 live	with	D	at	 the	 time	of	 the	alleged	 rapes	and	why	 she	 shared	 the	
same	bed	with	a	“rapist.”	DC’s	constant	refrain	was	that	C	would	hardly	have	behaved	like	this	
if	she	was	really	being	abused.	C’s	failure	to	leave	her	husband	has	a	bearing	on	the	issue	of	
consent	and	is	a	 legitimate	matter	for	some	cross-examination.	However,	 in	suggesting	that	
this	is	not	something	that	true	marital	rape	victims	do,	DC	was	resorting	to	one	of	the	fables	
about	 rape.	 It	 furthermore	 fails	 to	acknowledge	 the	difficulties	 that	 face	 immigrant	women	
who	may	 well	 face	 deportation	 if	 they	 leave	 their	 husbands	 and	 are	 therefore	 effectively	
trapped	in	abusive	relationships	(Carline	&	Easteal,	2014).	
A	 further	myth	 seen	 in	 these	 trials	 denies	 any	distinction	between	 consenting	 to	 some	
intimate	behavior	and	consenting	to	sex	(Gray,	2015;	Payne	et	al.,	1999).	In	three	trials	(4,	5,	
and	7),	DC	emphasized	that	C	had	consented	to	some	kissing.	There	is	every	reason	for	DC	
to	have	cross-examined	C	about	consensual	 kissing	 in	 these	 trials	but	 there	was	a	 further	
implication	that	consent	to	kissing	effectively	meant	consent	to	sex	or	that	C	rather	than	D	
was	to	blame	for	what	happened	thereafter.	
In	 Trial	 7,	 kissing	 preceding	 the	 alleged	 rape	 was	 emphasized.	 DC	 questioned	 C	 as	 to	
whether	she	agreed	to	being	kissed	by	D	and	whether	she	kissed	him	back.	C	said	that	she	
had	kissed	D	albeit	reluctantly.	DC’s	response	was	to	state	in	her	closing	speech,	“She	kissed	
him	back	and	she	knew	that	kissing	 led	to	other	things,	yet	she	did	not	ask	him	to	 leave.”	
The	issue	in	the	case	was	not	whether	C	consented	to	kissing	but	whether	she	consented	to	
sexual	intercourse.	DC	was	implying	that,	to	an	experienced	woman	“who	knew	that	kissing	
led	 to	 other	 things,”	 kissing	meant	 that	 she	 consented	 to	 sex	 as	well.	 PC,	 conceding	 that	
kissing	was	a	mistake	on	C’s	part,	dealt	with	this	implication	robustly:	“Even	if	she	had	a	kiss	
that	did	not	mean	that	she	wanted	full	sex	and	oral	sex.”	
Rape	 myths	 contain	 rigid	 prescriptions	 as	 to	 post-rape	 behavior.	 Genuine	 victims	 are	
expected	 to	 do	 all	 they	 can	 to	 escape	 from	 their	 attacker,	 to	 preserve	 the	 evidence	 as	 a	
prelude	 to	 reporting	 the	matter	 to	 the	 police,	 and	 to	 exhibit	 appropriate	 emotion	 when	
reporting	 the	matter	 and	 in	 court;	 but	 the	 trauma	 of	 the	 event	may	 affect	 individuals	 in	
different	ways	(e.g.,	Foa	&	Rothbaum,	1998).	Despite	this,	post-rape	behavior	came	under	
scrutiny	 in	 four	 trials	 (1,	5,	6,	and	7).	 In	Trial	6,	 for	example,	C	showered	and	washed	the	
sheets	after	 the	alleged	 rape.	DC	declared	 that	 this	was	 inconsistent	with	 the	behavior	of	
someone	who	had	been	sexually	assaulted	as	she	was	effectively	getting	rid	of	the	evidence.	
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In	 Trial	 7,	 DC	 drew	 the	 jury’s	 attention	 to	 C’s	 demeanor	 in	 court;	 rather	 than	 showing	
distress,	 she	was	 “feisty”	 and	 responded	with	 “fiery	 irritation”	 to	 questions	 put	 to	 her	 in	
cross-examination.	The	jury	was	asked	to	consider	whether	this	was	the	type	of	woman	who	
would	 have	 submitted	 to	 rape.	 C	 explained	 that	 she	 submitted	 to	 D	 after	 he	 had	 put	 a	
cushion	over	her	face	and	she	feared	he	was	going	to	kill	her.	However,	the	jury	was	being	
invited	to	conclude	that	C’s	failure	to	show	appropriate	distress	in	court	cast	doubt	on	the	
legitimacy	of	her	claim.	
Myths	relating	to	the	complainant’s	clothing	were	also	found	in	the	study.	The	myth	here	
is	that	clothing	or	its	absence	may	be	an	indicator	of	consent	to	sex	or	may	precipitate	rape,	
so	that	the	blame	for	rape	lies	with	the	complainant	rather	than	the	perpetrator	(e.g.,	Payne	
et	 al.,	 1999).	 It	 featured	 strongly	 in	 Trial	 6,	 in	 which	 C	 was	 allegedly	 raped	 by	 a	 former	
partner	 when	 she	 allowed	 him	 to	 stay	 over	 after	 he	 turned	 up	 at	 her	 flat.	 In	 cross-
examination	and	in	her	closing	speech	DC	referred	9	times	to	the	fact	that	C	wore	only	a	T-
shirt	and	no	undergarments	in	bed.	DC’s	argument	was	summed	up	in	her	closing	speech:	“If	
C	was	telling	the	truth	why	did	she	go	to	bed	in	that	way?”	Without	expressing	it	in	so	many	
words,	 the	 jury	was	also	plainly	being	 invited	 to	conclude	 that	even	 if	 she	was	 telling	 the	
truth	about	the	rape,	she	had	only	herself	to	blame	for	what	happened.	Yet,	DC	expressly	
denied	to	the	jury	that	she	was	having	recourse	to	“the	Neanderthal	belief	that,	if	you	go	to	
bed	with	a	bare	bottom,	you	are	asking	for	it.”	
The	 final	 myth	 identified	 in	 these	 trials	 focuses	 on	 the	 defendant,	 and	 suggests	 that	
rapists	are	 identifiable	because	they	are	“other,”	different	 from	normal	men	and	not	“the	
man	 next	 door.”	 However,	 most	 perpetrators	 are	 known	 to	 the	 victim	 (MJ,	 HO,	 &	 ONS,	
2013),	and	not	noticeably	“different”	from	other	men.	This	myth	cropped	up	in	two	trials	(4	
and	 7).	 In	 Trial	 4,	 the	 idea	 that	 sex	 offenders	 are	 “other”	was	 a	 convenient	myth	 for	 DC	
when	defending	a	seemingly	respectable	man.	D	had	been	in	the	army	for	many	years	and	
was	employed	as	a	part-time	teacher.	There	were	in	all	13	separate	references	to	D’s	good	
character	by	DC	and	the	 judge.	 In	her	closing	speech	DC	summed	 it	up	by	saying	 that	 the	
jury	had	to	decide	“Whether	D	was	a	respectable	but	silly	older	man	who	had	had	his	head	
turned	by	a	gothic	 redhead	or	whether	he	was	a	sex	offender,”	clearly	suggesting	that	he	
could	not	be	both.	
In	 Trial	 7,	 DC	 was	 faced	 with	 the	 difficult	 task	 of	 defending	 a	 man	 with	 a	 previous	
conviction	for	a	sex	offence,	which	had	been	disclosed	to	the	court.	DC	sought	to	show	that	
that	this	conviction	was	a	one-off	which	did	not	make	him	a	sex	offender.	Had	he	been	so,	
DC	argued,	he	would	have	attacked	C	in	the	street	and	the	attack	would	have	been	rushed.	
But,	as	it	was,	the	alleged	rape	had	taken	place	in	the	victim’s	home	and	did	not	involve	a	
quick	attack.	In	other	words,	D’s	behavior	did	not	match	that	of	a	true	sex	offender.	
In	 Theme	3,	myths	 associated	with	 the	particular	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 are	operationalized.	
There	may	 well	 be	 good	 reason	 to	 cross-examine	 C	 about	 the	 facts	 in	 question	 but	 this	
becomes	 problematic	 when	 the	 jury	 is,	 through	 repeated	 questioning	 and	 suggestion,	
invited	 to	 fall	 back	 on	 the	 stereotypes	 and	 conclude	 that	 these	 facts	 lead	 to	 the	
mythological	conclusion.	
Challenging	the	Stereotypes	
In	 an	 adversarial	 trial,	 the	 use	 of	 rape	 mythology	 by	 the	 defense	 can	 be	 challenged	 by	
prosecution	witnesses,	by	PC,	and	by	the	 judge.	The	extent	to	which	this	happened	 in	the	
present	study	will	now	be	considered.	
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Prosecution	challenges.	Not	all	complainants	 in	the	study	were	afraid	to	take	 issue	with	the	
myths	used	by	the	defense.	In	Trial	7,	for	example,	where	DC	put	it	to	C	that	she	had	made	a	
false	allegation	motivated	by	a	desire	 to	get	close	to	a	male	 friend,	she	retorted,	 “The	 idea	
that	 I	 would	 put	 myself	 through	 this	 in	 an	 attention	 seeking	 exercise	 is	 unbelievable.”	
However,	such	a	robust	reply	from	a	complainant	was	unusual.	
There	were	comparatively	few	attempts	by	PC	to	challenge	the	myths.	However,	such	an	
attempt	was	made	in	Trial	6,	which	involved	the	alleged	rape	by	a	former	partner.	As	noted	
above,	 the	 defense	 in	 this	 case	 had	much	 to	 say	 about	 C’s	 night	 attire.	 PC	 in	 her	 closing	
speech	directly	and	skillfully	addressed	this	issue:	
Rape	does	not	always	 involve	 somebody	being	dragged	off	 the	street	 into	 the	bushes.	
Rapes	 happen	 in	 relationships;	 they	 are	 committed	 by	 people	 you	 trust.	 Was	 C	 not	
entitled	to	trust	this	person	with	whom	she	had	been	in	a	relationship	for	6	years?	She	
knew	him	really	well	and	 felt	 that	 it	was	ok	 for	him	to	be	 in	her	house.	He	had	never	
done	anything	like	this	before	so	she	felt	safe.	Her	getting	into	bed	with	no	knickers	did	
not	mean	anything.	It	did	not	mean	to	him,	as	he	had	told	the	court,	that	sex	was	on	the	
agenda.	
Similarly,	 in	Trial	7,	PC	directly	addressed	the	stereotypes	in	a	case	where	C	had	allowed	a	
stranger	into	her	flat	and	had	on	previous	occasions	had	sex	with	strangers:	
That	night	she	did	not	want	sex.	She	was	entitled	to	say	that	she	did	not	want	sex.	Even	
if	she	had	a	kiss	that	did	not	mean	that	she	wanted	full	sex	and	oral	sex.	A	woman	was	
entitled	to	say	no	and	she	did	say	no.	
In	 these	 trials,	 there	 are	 a	 few	 instances	 of	 well-constructed	 challenges	 to	 rape	 myths.	
However,	 despite	 the	 number	 and	 variety	 of	 myths	 used	 by	 DC	 and	 the	 opportunity	 to	
challenge	them	in	cross-examination	of	D,	and	in	re-examination	of	C,	such	challenges	were	
rare.	PC	were	therefore	missing	opportunities	to	warn	the	jury	against	drawing	conclusions	
based	on	generalized	and	false	assumptions	about	rape.	
Judicial	 interventions	and	directions.	The	sheer	number	of	myth	invocations	in	the	course	of	
the	 eight	 trials	meant	 there	was	 ample	 opportunity	 for	 judges	 to	 tackle	 some	 of	 them	 by	
intervening	where	cross-examination	of	C	became	oppressive	or	 irrelevant	and	 in	 their	 jury	
directions.	Myth-related	judicial	interventions	were	rare.	But	in	Trial	7,	DC,	invoking	the	myth	
that	 false	 allegations	 are	 very	 common	 because	 many	 complainants	 are	 mentally	 ill,	
questioned	C	about	suffering	depression	in	the	past	and	whether	she	had	attempted	suicide	
as	a	teenager.	The	judge	intervened	saying,	“What’s	that	got	to	do	with	the	price	of	eggs?	If	
you	want	to	pursue	that,	I	want	to	hear	the	legal	argument.”	Undeterred,	DC	then	put	it	to	C	
that	she	had	the	tendency	to	be	low	and	depressed.	
The	 Crown	 Court	 Bench	 Book4	 (JSB,	 2010)	 provides	 a	 non-exhaustive	 list	 of	 commonly	
held	and	mistaken	assumptions	about	rape.	These	include	the	following:	C	wore	provocative	
clothing,	therefore	she	must	have	wanted	sex;	C	got	drunk	in	male	company,	therefore	she	
must	have	been	prepared	for	sex;	a	complainant	in	a	relationship	with	the	alleged	attacker	
is	 likely	 to	have	consented;	 rape	 takes	place	between	strangers;	 rape	does	not	 take	place	
without	 physical	 resistance	 from	 the	 victim;	 if	 it	 is	 rape,	 there	must	 be	 injuries;	 a	 person	
who	 has	 been	 sexually	 assaulted	 reports	 it	 as	 soon	 as	 possible;	 a	 person	 who	 has	 been	
sexually	assaulted	remembers	events	consistently.	
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The	Bench	Book	also	provides	a	series	of	illustrative	directions,	referred	to	as	“Illustrations,”	
for	 judges	 to	 use	 if	 they	 so	 choose	when	 directing	 the	 jury	 to	 correct	 the	 listed	mistaken	
assumptions	 (for	 a	 critique,	 see	 Temkin,	 2010).	 The	 first	 Illustration	 concerns	 avoiding	
judgments	based	on	stereotypes	of	the	nature	of	rape	and	the	type	of	person	who	can	be	a	
rapist	or	the	victim	of	rape.	The	rest	are	geared	to	the	following:	“avoiding	assumptions	when	
the	complainant	and	defendant	are	known	to	one	another,”	“effect	of	trauma	on	demeanor	in	
evidence,”	 “late	 reporting,”	 “absence	 of	 force	 or	 the	 threat	 of	 force,”	 “some	 consensual	
activity—no	 overt	 force—lack	 of	 resistance”	 (including	 lack	 of	 injury),	 “provocative	 dress—
hard	drinking—flirtation—previous	 sexual	 relationship,”	 “the	defendant’s	 assertion	of	other	
(and	better)	opportunities	for	consensual	activity,”	and	“inconsistent	complaints.”	In	six	out	of	
the	eight	trials	 (Trial	2	did	not	reach	the	summing-up	stage)	 in	this	study,	stereotypes	were	
utilized	by	the	defense,	which	could	have	been	addressed	using	these	Illustrations.	
In	Trial	1,	three	stereotypes	were	invoked	by	the	defense	none	of	which	were	clearly	covered	
by	 the	 Illustrations.	 The	 judge	 did,	 however,	 respond	 to	 DC’s	 character	 assassination	 of	 the	
complainant.	He	said	that	the	jury	might	perceive	C	to	be	“troublesome	and	troubling,”	but	that	
the	jury	should	deal	with	the	hard	evidence,	and	that	“Even	people	who’ve	behaved	badly	in	the	
past	are	entitled	to	the	protection	of	the	law.”	
In	 Trial	 3,	 six	 myths	 were	 utilized	 by	 the	 defense.	 The	 judge	 used	 the	 three	 available	
Illustrations—“avoiding	 assumptions	 when	 the	 complainant	 and	 defendant	 are	 known	 to	
one	 another,”	 “lack	 of	 resistance,”	 and	 “late	 reporting”—and	 did	 so	most	 effectively.	 He	
said	that	the	issue	was	whether	C	consented	to	sexual	intercourse.	The	fact	that	they	were	
married	did	not	create	a	legal	obligation	on	her	part	to	consent.	There	was	no	obligation	to	
fight	or	scream	when	not	consenting,	and	indeed	there	might	be	good	reason	for	not	doing	
so—in	this	case,	C	had	said	that	she	feared	her	daughter	might	hear	what	was	happening.	
He	went	on	to	say	that	the	jury	had	to	be	careful	when	considering	delay.	They	had	to	bear	
in	mind	that	there	could	be	a	reason	why	a	woman	did	not	immediately	tell	the	police	or	a	
friend.	Reticence	could	be	very	understandable,	for	example,	C	needed	a	roof	over	her	head	
and	 funds	 to	 live	off.	 In	 this	case,	delay	was	a	material	 consideration	 that	 the	 jury	had	 to	
think	about.	
In	Trial	4,	 six	myths	were	utilized	by	 the	defense.	There	were	15	 references	 to	 the	 fact	
that	 D	 and	 C	 were	 former	 partners,	 much	 was	 made	 of	 D’s	 army	 background	 and	 good	
character,	 and	 myths	 relating	 to	 kissing	 and	 delay	 in	 reporting	 were	 also	 invoked.	 The	
Illustrations	on	previous	sexual	relationship,	who	can	be	a	rapist,	some	consensual	activity,	
and	late	reporting	were	thus	available,	but	the	judge	chose	to	give	no	judicial	directions	on	
stereotypes	at	all.	
In	Trial	5,	the	defense	used	five	myths	of	which	three	were	covered	by	the	Illustrations	on	
“late	reporting,”	“some	consensual	activity,”	and	“demeanor	in	evidence.”	Some	reference	
was	made	to	two	of	them.	The	judge	said	that	if	the	jury	found	there	was	a	late	complaint;	
they	had	to	consider	what	the	reasons	for	this	were.	Using	the	language	of	the	Illustration,	
he	said,	“a	 late	complaint	 is	not	necessarily	a	false	complaint.”	This	phrasing	suggests	that	
the	late	complaint	might	well	have	been	a	false	complaint.	The	judge	also	gave	a	direction	
regarding	C’s	manifest	distress	in	court,	during	the	police	interview	and	when	reporting	the	
matter	to	friends,	which	was	referred	to	by	the	prosecution.	He	said	that	it	was	for	the	jury	
to	decide	whether	such	distress	was	genuine	or	feigned.	If	they	decided	it	was	genuine,	they	
must	decide	whether	it	was	related	to	what	she	had	alleged	had	happened	to	her.	It	might	
be	thought	that,	in	the	form	they	were	given,	these	directions	would	have	served	if	anything	
to	increase	skepticism	about	the	complainant.	
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In	 Trial	 6,	 seven	 myths	 were	 invoked.	 There	 were	 three	 relevant	 Illustrations:	 those	
concerning	“avoiding	assumptions	when	the	complainant	and	defendant	are	known	to	one	
another,”	“provocative	dress,”	and	“lack	of	 injury.”	The	 judge	made	reference	 to	all	 three	
albeit	very	briefly.	Before	doing	so,	he	repeated	Hale’s	notorious	dictum:	“Sexual	allegations	
are	easy	allegations	to	make	but	difficult	to	refute.”	As	to	C’s	lack	of	undergarments	in	bed,	
which	 the	 defense	 had	 heavily	 emphasized,	 he	 commented	 that	 if	 it	 was	 the	 automatic	
assumption	of	a	man	that	it	was	“game	on”	if	she	was	in	bed	with	no	knickers,	then	it	would	
also	be	the	assumption	of	a	mature	woman.	In	other	words,	the	judge	was	suggesting	that	C	
either	knew	 that	D	would	 think	 she	was	 consenting	or	 should	have	known.	 If	 she	did	not	
actually	consent,	she	was	to	blame	for	what	happened.	But	he	added	that	the	jury	had	to	be	
careful	 about	making	 assumptions.	 They	 had	 to	 consider	what	 evidence	 in	 this	 case	was	
relevant.	
In	Trial	7,	the	defense	resorted	to	six	separate	myths	five	of	which	were	dealt	with	by	the	
Illustrations,	“lack	of	resistance,”	“avoiding	judgments	based	on	stereotypes	as	to	what	kind	
of	person	may	be	a	 rapist,”	 “demeanor	 in	 court,”	 “sexual	history,”	and	“some	consensual	
activity.”	 The	 judge	 adapted	 the	 last	 two	 of	 these	 Illustrations.	 He	 addressed	 the	 myth	
relating	to	some	consensual	activity	with	admirable	clarity:	
A	woman	is	entitled	to	“snog”	a	stranger	and	then	say	“That’s	enough:	that’s	as	far	as	I	
am	going.”	Even	if	they	were	sharing	cannabis	and	drinking,	that	did	not	mean	that	D	
had	a	license	to	continue	to	do	whatever	he	wanted	sexually	without	her	consent.	
The	 judge’s	 direction	 on	 sexual	 history,	 evidence	 of	 which	 emerged	 during	 the	 trial,	 was	
again	exemplary:	
The	manner	in	which	C	gave	evidence	made	it	clear	that	she	was	sexually	experienced	
before	the	incident.	This	is	not	a	court	of	morals;	it	is	a	court	of	law.	If	someone	chose	
to	have	sexual	intercourse	with	a	hundred	people,	that	should	have	no	bearing	on	the	
jury’s	consideration	of	what	happened	that	night.	A	person	could	consent	to	sex	with	a	
hundred	people	but	if	he	or	she	said	no	to	the	101st,	then	that	was	No	.	.	.	The	fact	that	
she	had	previous	 sexual	partners	 and	 that	 some	of	 these	might	have	been	 strangers	
was	irrelevant	to	the	issue	of	consent	on	the	night.	
In	Trial	8,	C	was	a	16-year-old	allegedly	raped	by	another	teenager.	The	defense	focused	
heavily	on	the	 lack	of	resistance	myth	for	which	an	Illustration	 is	available.	There	were	no	
fewer	 than	 14	 references	 and	 questions	 as	 to	 why	 she	 did	 not	 shout	 for	 help,	 seek	 to	
escape,	or	seek	assistance	from	the	police	who	were	nearby.	The	judge	said	no	more	to	the	
jury	than	that	it	was	unnecessary	to	prove	resistance	and	then	simply	repeated	what	C	had	
said	without	further	comment.	He	went	on	to	give	a	general	direction	on	stereotypes	based	
on	the	first	Illustration.	However,	without	relating	it	in	any	way	to	the	case	in	hand,	the	jury	
may	well	have	been	baffled	as	to	what	he	was	getting	at.	
The	 list	of	myths	mentioned	 in	 the	Bench	Book	 is	expressed	 to	be	non-exhaustive	 (JSB,	
2010).	 The	 judges	 in	 this	 study,	 for	 the	most	 part,	 chose	 not	 to	 stray	 beyond	 the	 list	 to	
address	 other	myths.	At	 the	 same	 time,	many	of	 the	myths	 specifically	mentioned	 in	 the	
Bench	Book	were	not	properly	addressed.	The	Bench	Book	is	emphatic	that	there	is	no	need	
for	the	judge	to	caution	the	jury	about	myths	and,	if	a	choice	is	made	to	address	a	particular	
myth,	this	must	be	done	in	a	fair	and	balanced	way	and	in	consultation	with	both	advocates.	
Across	the	seven	cases	in	which	there	was	a	summing-
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defense	 and	 there	were	 19	 opportunities	 to	make	 use	 of	 an	 Illustration	 to	warn	 the	 jury	
about	 specific	 myths.	 Eleven	 such	 warnings	 were	 given	 (see	 Table	 2)	 with	 one	 further	
general	warning	about	stereotypes.	But	of	the	11,	at	least	four	were	perfunctory	and,	if	the	
purpose	of	a	myth	direction	is	to	correct	misleading	assumptions,	several	more	were	of	no	
use	in	that	regard.	While	the	judges	in	Trials	3	and	7	dealt	very	effectively	and	fairly	with	the	
stereotypes,	 in	 the	 remaining	 five	 trials,	 they	 were	 handled	 with	 considerably	 less	
assurance.	 It	 is	concerning	that	 in	Trial	4	where	the	defense	drew	heavily	upon	six	myths,	
the	 judge	chose	 to	 say	nothing	whatever	about	any	of	 them	and	 that	 in	Trial	6	 the	 judge	
solemnly	repeated	Hale’s	infamous	dictum.	It	is	also	less	than	reassuring	that	in	Trial	5	the	
myths	 were	 addressed	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 conceivably	 to	 augment	 skepticism	 about	 the	
complainant.	
The	only	convictions	in	the	sample	were	in	Trials	1,	3,	and	7.	In	any	trial,	there	are	likely	to	
be	a	number	of	factors	that	contribute	to	the	jury’s	verdict.	In	the	absence	of	access	to	the	
jury’s	deliberations,5	 it	 cannot	be	ascertained	with	any	degree	of	 certainty	how	much	 the	
rape	myths	mobilized	in	the	trials	influenced	the	verdicts,	how	much	the	challenges	to	them	
had	 any	 effect,	 or	 what	 the	 significance	 was	 of	 other	 variables.	 Certainly,	 in	 Trial	 1,	 the	
evidence	against	the	defendant	was	overwhelming	and	the	conviction	was	therefore	to	be	
expected	and,	in	Trial	3,	C	was	a	particularly	credible	witness.	It	has	been	argued	by	Bohner	
et	 al.	 (2009)	 that,	 as	 schemas,	 rape	myths	 are	 likely	 to	 provide	 an	 attitudinal	 scaffolding	
within	which	the	evidence	is	interpreted.	If	this	is	so,	it	follows	that	effective	challenges	to	
these	 myths	 may	 undermine	 that	 attitudinal	 scaffolding.	 In	 Trials	 3	 and	 7,	 the	 judges’	
excellent	directions	on	myths	may	therefore	have	had	some	impact	on	the	jury	and,	in	Trial	
7,	both	C	and	PC	also	challenged	the	myths	and	this	may	have	had	some	effect.	Conversely,	
in	 the	 cases	 where	 there	 was	 an	 acquittal,	 there	 were	 no	 effective	 directions	 from	 the	
judge.	 Indeed,	 in	 Trial	 6,	 the	 judge’s	 summing-up,	 if	 anything,	would	 have	 reinforced	 the	
rape	myths	that	were	used	by	the	defense	in	the	trial.	The	value	of	myth	directions,	properly	
delivered,	does,	of	course,	transcend	their	likely	effect	in	any	particular	trial	as	they	send	a	
public	message	about	the	dangers	of	false	assumptions	about	rape.	
For	the	most	part,	the	judges	did	not	employ	the	stilted	language	used	in	the	Illustrations	
but	preferred	to	adapt	and	simplify	them.	This	practice	is	to	be	welcomed	and	is	given	full	
license	in	the	Bench	Book	itself	(JSB,	2010).	The	list	of	myths	used	in	the	trials	as	set	out	in	
Table	2	demonstrates	that	the	Illustrations	are	far	from	covering	the	full	range.	It	may	well	
be	 that	 some	are	unsuited	 to	 a	 direction.	However,	 some	more	 Illustrations	 to	 cover,	 for	
example,	responses	to	marital	rape	including	failure	to	leave	the	marital	bed	or	home,	post-
rape	behavior,	and	previous	allegations	of	rape	would	undoubtedly	be	helpful.	
Conclusion	
The	extensive	modern	 literature	on	rape	myths—be	it	psychological	or	socio-legal—has	so	
far	lacked	sufficient	grounding	in	the	actual	evidence	of	myth	usage	in	the	courtroom.	As	an	
observational	 study	 of	 practice	 in	 the	 courts,	 this	 study	 makes	 a	 novel	 contribution	 to	
understanding	the	way	in	which	rape	myths	are	used	and	challenged	in	the	“real	world.”	Its	
originality	 lies	 in	 its	 delineation	 of	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 myths	 are	 deployed	 to	
manipulate	 jurors.	 Thus,	 rape	 myths	 are	 seen	 to	 serve	 a	 variety	 of	 different	 functions,	
supplying	DC	with	a	range	of	options	in	seeking	to	influence	juries.	The	study	also	suggests	
the	possibility	that	skillful	challenges	to	rape	myths	may	help	to	counter	their	influence.	
Given	the	small	number	of	trials,	generalizable	claims	cannot	be	made.	Further	large-scale	
observational	 research,	 both	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 in	 other	 jurisdictions	 with	
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adversarial	 systems,	would	 be	 useful	 to	 generate	 quantitative	 data,	which	would	 provide	
stronger	 evidence	 of	 the	 nature	 and	 extent	 of	 the	 myths	 used	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 of	
prosecution	 and	 judicial	 challenges	 to	 the	 myths.	 However,	 the	 finding	 that	 a	 wide	
repertoire	of	myths	was	pressed	into	service	by	the	defense	in	the	observed	trials—five	or	
more	myths	 in	 the	majority	of	 trials—suggests	 that	 the	use	of	 rape	mythology	 is	 still	well	
entrenched.	Nor	is	there	any	indication	in	this	study	that	any	of	the	well-worn	myths	about	
rape	have	fallen	into	desuetude.	Indeed,	rape	mythology	would	appear	to	be	a	key	defense	
tool	regardless	of	the	nature	of	the	alleged	assault	or	the	overall	strength	of	the	prosecution	
case.	 Given	 the	 wealth	 of	 knowledge	 about	 the	 likely	 impact	 of	 stereotyping	 on	 jurors	
Temkin	&	Krahé,	2008),	this	should	cause	some	concern.	The	Angiolini	(2015)	review	found	
that	prosecutors	failed	consistently	to	identify	rape	myths	and	concluded	that	the	handling	
of	rape	cases	by	the	Criminal	Justice	System	remains	problematic.	
It	 is	 disappointing	 that,	 on	 the	 whole,	 myth	 usage	 by	 the	 defense	 was	 insufficiently	
challenged	by	 the	prosecution	although	 there	were	a	 few	 instances	of	 counsel	 employing	
skillful	and	robust	counter-arguments.	Similarly,	while	several	judges	in	the	study	addressed	
the	myths	 very	 fairly	 and	 adeptly,	 others	 failed	 to	 give	 adequate	 or	 indeed	 any	 warning	
about	them	or	to	make	use	of	the	Illustrations.	
The	study	also	suggests	 that	s.41,	which	places	strict	 limits	on	 the	use	of	sexual	history	
evidence	 in	 court,	 is	 still	 not	 doing	 the	 job	 it	 is	 supposed	 to	 do.	 Moreover,	 if	 Trial	 1	 is	
anything	to	go	by,	s.100	may	also	not	be	providing	much	protection	for	complainants	from	
over-reaching	 cross-examination	 about	 their	 “bad	 character.”	 Given	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
adversarial	 system,	 it	 may	 be	 too	much	 to	 expect	 defense	 barristers	 to	 curb	 their	 ways.	
However,	at	 the	very	 least,	 they	must	be	held	to	account	 for	 flagrant	breaches	of	 the	 law	
such	as	in	England	and	Wales	when	s.41	is	ignored.	
All	 these	 findings	 suggest	 that	 further	 training	 for	 prosecutors	 and	 judges	 is	 necessary.	
The	 Angiolini	 review	 recommended	 that	 more	 training	 programs	 for	 prosecutors	 be	
introduced	urgently	 to	 enhance	 rape	myth	 recognition	 and	 it	 is	 suggested	here	 that	 such	
training	 should	be	 extended	 to	 all	 barristers	who	appear	 in	 sexual	 assault	 cases	 involving	
both	 adults	 and	 children.	 Training	 about	 rape	mythology	 could	 usefully	 take	 the	 form	 of	
encouraging	awareness	of	the	subtle	ways	 in	which	myths	are	 invoked	and	the	misleading	
assumptions	 that	 arise	 from	 them,	 as	 well	 as	 enabling	 prosecution	 counsel	 to	 develop	
effective	 counter-narratives	 to	 those	 employed	 by	 the	 defense.	 As	 noted	 above,	 there	 is	
some	excellent	prosecutorial	and	judicial	practice	in	this	area	that	could	be	put	to	good	use	
in	training	programs.	
It	 is	 disturbing	 that	 false	 ideas	 about	 rape	played	 such	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 these	 eight	
21st-century	trials.	If	the	adversarial	system	and	jury	trials	countenance	the	use	of	any	tricks	
or	 falsities	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 playing	 the	 game	 and	 defending	 the	 accused,	 then	 serious	
questions	must	be	 asked	about	 its	moral	 validity	 and	 the	extent	 to	which	 it	 is	 capable	of	
giving	 protection	 to	 victims.	 It	 is	 suggested	here	 that	 the	way	 forward	 lies	 in	 further	 and	
deeper	education	of	prosecuting	authorities	and	judges	about	rape	myths	and	their	malign	
effect.	 A	 reconsideration	 of	 the	 role	 of	 experts	 in	 this	 context	 would	 also	 be	 of	 value.	
Moreover,	 powers	 exist	 in	 many	 jurisdictions	 to	 challenge	 the	 use	 of	 rape	 myths	 in	 the	
courtroom	in	a	variety	of	different	ways.	It	is	high	time	these	were	fully	operationalized.	
Notes	
1. In	England	and	Wales,	“barristers”	are	lawyers	trained	to	practice	as	advocates	in	court.	
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2. The	Crown	Prosecution	Service	 (CPS)	 is	 in	 charge	of	 all	 public	prosecutions	 in	England	
and	Wales.	
3. Serious	offences	are	dealt	with	by	judge	and	jury	in	the	Crown	Courts	
4. The	Crown	Court	Bench	Book	is	the	official	handbook	for	judges	presiding	over	criminal	
trials	in	the	Crown	Courts	in	England	and	Wales.	
5. Access	to	jury	discussions	in	England	and	Wales	is	prevented	by	the	Contempt	of	Court	
Act	1981.	
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